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MODELLING THE HISTORY OF IDEAS1
Arianna Betti and Hein van den Berg
We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the
shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the
model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately
developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the
history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use
explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks
models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical
texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing
approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to
Skinner’s objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased
reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called
Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and
cognitive psychology.
KEYWORDS: methodology of the history of philosophy; history of
ideas; models; concept drift; schemata; history of scientiﬁc
methodology; Lovejoy; Kuukkanen
INTRODUCTION
The history of ideas has long been a discipline in disrepute. It has been
criticized as involving an improper method that does not provide a proper
understanding of historical texts. The aim of this paper is to propose a
new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so
often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach
to the history of ideas. We maintain that any adequately developed and
implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human
thought (or concept drift) will require that historians use explicit interpretive
conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models.
1We thank participants of the Naturphilosophisches Kolloquium TU Dortmund, members of
the theoretical philosophy section VU Amsterdam, and participants of the conference The
Future of the Theory and Philosophy of History (Ghent, July 2013) for helpful comments.
The work on this paper was supported by the European Research Council under grant
203194; and by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) under a
Casimir–Ziegler Research Grant.
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Our proposal blocks holistic objections as well as Skinner’s criticism that
the history of ideas is a biased account that yields arbitrary and biased nar-
ratives. The novelties of our approach are fourfold. First, we construe ideas
as (parts of) models. As a result, the ideas with which we can properly work
will tend to be (highly) complex. Second, we counter holistic objections by
adopting a neutral stance with respect to the ontological nature of ideas and
by arguing that historians of ideas can trace continuities without assuming a
notion of (strict) identity between ideas. Third, we counter Skinner’s objec-
tion that the history of ideas yields arbitrary narratives by arguing that the
results of applying interpretive models in the history of ideas are empirical
hypotheses. We counter Skinner’s objection that using models in the
history of ideas results in biased accounts by arguing that the only defence
against biases is to make them explicit. We submit that our use of explicit
models is thus the best methodological defence against the risk of interpre-
tive biases and support our ﬁndings with work in cognitive psychology. Our
approach is more general than existing proposals because it allows us to
detect continuity even in case of ideas that share no common features.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section examines criticisms of
Lovejoy’s method of the history of ideas, while the third section examines exist-
ing defences, in particular Kuukkanen’s recently developed core/margin
approach. The fourth section introduces our own proposed method for improv-
ing existing defences by way of an employment of explicit interpretive models.
While adopting Kuukkanen’s distinction between the core and margin of an
idea or concept, we argue that any truly implementable method in the history
of ideas will require that this core/margin vocabulary be applied to highly
complex ideas conceived as (parts of) models. We also submit that not only
the intension but also the extension of concepts must be considered when study-
ing concept drift. In the ﬁfth section, we illustrate our approach by examining an
especially clear example of a model, the Classical Model of Science (CMS). In
the sixth section, we show how the use of models as interpretive frameworks
counters Skinner’s biases objection by arguing that models function like cogni-
tive schemata, in the sense of the schema theory of knowledge.
In the paper, we speak interchangeably of ‘ideas’ and ‘concepts’. We
remain neutral on a number of philosophical theories of concepts. For our
purposes, it is sufﬁcient that concepts are (expressible in language by) (cate-
gorematic) terms, and that they are compositional; that is, if complex, they
are composed of subconcepts. These latter, subconcepts, we sometimes
call ‘features’, a term which, again, can be interpreted simply to mean
(occurrences of meaningful) expressions.
LOVEJOY’S HISTORY OF IDEAS: OBJECTIONS
Lovejoy characterized the history of ideas as being concerned with unit-
ideas that emerge throughout history. The historian must isolate certain





























unit-ideas and trace their history in various contexts (Lovejoy, Great Chain
of Being, 3–7, 15). Thus, for example, historians may isolate the idea of
evolution and go on to trace the history of this idea in various periods and
intellectual settings, and including different disciplines (in biology, then,
but also astronomy, geology, literature, philosophy, and theology)
(Lovejoy, ‘Historiography of Ideas’, 541–2). In this way, Lovejoy argues,
we gain a uniﬁed perspective on a mass of historical facts and so render
them intelligible (ibid., 538–9).
It is well known that Lovejoy’s method has been subject to a number of
criticisms, mainly directed against the notion of a unit-idea. Lovejoy
construed unit-ideas as static entities that remain identical through
time, although they enter into various thought-complexes. Consider the
unit-idea chosen people. Lovejoy took it to be expressed by a propositional
function ‘x(s) are the chosen people’. This idea has been entertained in many
periods, yet was combined with ‘different assumptions as to what people x
should stand for’ (Lovejoy, ‘Reply to Professor Spitzer’, 210). At different
times, different values have been assigned to x, for example, the Jewish
people, and thus different thought-complexes (wholes) have emerged. The
unit-idea itself, however, in Lovejoy’s view, remained unchanged. Critics
of Lovejoy have denied the existence of unchanging unit-ideas. They
deny, in particular, that ideas or concepts retain their meaning over time
and across contexts.
This kind of criticism has generally been taken to undermine the credi-
bility of Lovejoy’s methodology for the history of ideas as a proper historical
method (Wilson, ‘Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being’). In the rest of this
section, we offer a systematic review of well-known arguments against
Lovejoy’s method, and in the following section, review some common
defences. Defenders of Lovejoy argue that the criticisms of his view do
not discredit his methodology or the history of ideas more generally.
Though we agree that the arguments are inconclusive, we think that their
inconclusiveness has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. This applies in
particular to the holist critique under (a) below, and to Skinner’s objections
under (d). Because of this, we argue, we still lack an adequately developed
methodology of the history of ideas; more work is needed to establish that
history of ideas is a proper method. In the fourth section, we undertake
this work.
Let us now consider the arguments against Lovejoy.
(a) Holism. The existence of unit-ideas is incompatible with holism.
According to holism, a concept is fully determined by its relation to
thought-complexes (wholes) (Spitzer, ‘Geistesgeschichte’; cf. Lovejoy,
‘Reply to Professor Spitzer’, 206–7). Consider, following Hintikka, Love-
joy’s prime example of a unit-idea: the principle of plenitude, that is (the
idea) that every genuine possibility is eventually actualized. The meaning
of this principle, says Hintikka, differs in different theoretical contexts
(e.g. in Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz). If this is so, then plenitude is





























not a unit-idea. It is a conglomerate of ideas, that is, many ideas, all different,
and not one and the same idea. Given that Lovejoy’s prime example of a
unit-idea fails to be one, Hintikka continues, we can doubt the existence
of unit-ideas altogether (Hintikka, ‘Gaps’, 26–8, 34). Put in general terms,
for holists concept a in context or concept constellation abc does not have
the same meaning as concept a in context ade (it is, indeed, a-in-abc, not
a-in-ade). No part of these constellations remains unchanged; therefore,
there is nothing like a unit-idea that remains identical.
(b) Conceptual change. If Lovejoy’s unit-ideas are simple elements that
do not undergo change, it is not clear how we could write a history of
such ideas (Mink, ‘Change and Causality’, 9–14).
(c) Scope. Deﬁning the scope of unit-ideas is problematic. Suppose we
want to write the history of the idea of evolution in the nineteenth century
following Lovejoy’s approach. We would then need to specify features of
this idea that enable us to attribute it to, say, Lamarck, as well as to
Wallace and Darwin. But this raises a dilemma (Kuukkanen, ‘Conceptual
Change’, 355–6). A narrowly Darwinian deﬁnition of evolution cannot prop-
erly be attributed to other historical actors or authors. A too broad deﬁnition
of evolution, on the other hand, would overlook important differences
among these authors (Bevir, History of Ideas, 203).
(d) Arbitrariness and biases. Skinner judged Lovejoy’s methodology both
(i) arbitrary, because it does not yield a proper understanding of historical
texts, and (ii) biased, because it necessarily relies upon preconceived
models in interpreting these texts. Ad (i): understanding the statements of
authors requires insight into their intentions; yet studying unit-ideas does
not provide such an understanding, for it abstracts from authors’ intentions
(Skinner, Visions of Politics, 79–86). If we do the latter, as Lovejoy allegedly
does, we also cannot explain the relevance of certain ideas for certain authors
in certain historical periods (ibid.; cf. Mendelbaum, ‘History of Ideas’, 37).
Ad (ii): Skinner notes that by our ‘mental set’ we are ‘set to perceive details
in a certain way’. This, according to Skinner, is not conducive to the writing
of any proper history. Insofar as we ‘classify the unfamiliar in terms of the
familiar’, we run the danger of attributing some meaning to a historical
text that the author could not have intended to convey (Skinner, Visions of
Politics, 58–9).
LOVEJOY’S HISTORY OF IDEAS: REPLIES
Existing counterarguments to (a)–(d) go as follows.
Against (a) Holism. Recall Hintikka’s point concerning the principle of
plenitude: it is a conglomerate of many, different ideas, not a single, unchan-
ging idea continuous over time. There are two standard responses to this hol-
istic critique: (i) Gram and Martin’s family resemblance account and (ii)
Lovejoy’s absurd consequence rebuttal.





























(i) Gram and Martin’s family resemblance rebuttal. According to Gram
and Martin, unit-ideas can be saved by appeal to a notion of family
resemblance (‘Perils of Plenitude’, 509–10). We classify, for example, the
principle of plenitude as one idea because of a family resemblance among
its various instances in different contexts. This account is considered unsa-
tisfactory by some of Lovejoy’s defenders because of the so-called
problem of wide-open texture. Family resemblance, it is said, captures too
much, and arbitrarily so, for there is always some resemblance among a
concept a, and any other concept b, such that a and b may very well share
no features at all. If a and b have no common features, we have no reason
to treat them as one concept uniﬁed by family resemblance rather than two
concepts (Kuukkanen, ‘Conceptual Change’, 365–6, building upon Ander-
son, ‘Kuhn’s Account’).
(ii) Lovejoy’s absurd consequence rebuttal. Lovejoy, followed by Kuukka-
nen, holds that the notion of unit-ideas can be retained because holism has
absurd consequences. According to Lovejoy, the communicability of ideas
requires that different minds share (at least in some cases) ideas, that is, that
these ideas are held in common (‘Reply to Professor Spitzer’, 207). Now, accord-
ing to Lovejoy, holism entails that no two thinkers can have the same idea, which
is an absurd claim, for it implies that ideas are incommunicable; therefore, holism
is false. Kuukkanen (‘Conceptual Change’, 360–2) adds that the very possibility
of writing history requires that historians think of concepts employed by histori-
cal actors as instances of more general concepts shared by them.
Is this rebuttal against holism effective, and is it preferable to the family
resemblance account? We do not think so. We claim in the ﬁfth section
that tracing continuities in the history of ideas does not require assuming a
notion of (strict) identity between ideas; in particular, continuity can be
detected even in case of ideas sharing no common features.
Against (b) Conceptual Change. This objection is usually met by giving
up the simplicity of ideas, and thus arguing that ideas can change because
they are complex: they have parts, and what changes are their parts. Although
Lovejoy sometimes describes his discipline as the study of simple unit-ideas,
many theorists have denied that the history of ideas requires assuming that
unit-ideas are simple (Bredsdorff, ‘Lovejoy’s Idea of ‘Idea’’; Kvastad, ‘On
Method’, 99). We agree: the ideas of which we can properly do history
are in fact bound to be complex. Yet now a second problem arises: how is
it possible to say that the parts of a (complex) idea can change, while the
idea itself remains the same? Note that this objection differs from the
holist’s, though both point to the same general difﬁculty (what is many
and different cannot be one and the same). Holists maintain that idea a in
complex abc cannot be identical to idea a in complex ade; the present objec-
tion maintains that idea a composed of subparts a1a2a3 cannot be the same as
idea a composed of subparts a1a2a4.
This problem can be solved, as Kuukkanen points out, by distinguishing
between the core and margin of a concept. The identity of concepts is





























deﬁned in terms of their core, which is taken to comprise the concept’s stable
and context-unspeciﬁc features, that is, features that persist over some
amount of time (Kuukkanen, ‘Conceptual Change’, 367). The margin of a
concept comprises rather its variable and context-speciﬁc features. For
example, Kuukkanen deﬁnes the core of the concept of element in terms
of the subconcepts of a body that is (1) material and (2) indecomposable.
Call the conjunction of (1) and (2) the core of the idea of element, and
mark it with a1a2. If historical actors accept a1a2 (that is, if they think of
element as a material and indecomposable body) they can be said to
accept the concept of element. The margin of the idea of element comprises
certain subideas such as: (a3) found in all (other) bodies, (a4) responsible for
observable qualities of (other) bodies, etc. (ibid., 367–8).
The core/margin distinction allows Kuukkanen to give a nice account of
conceptual stability, conceptual change, and conceptual replacement (ibid.,
368–71). In the case of conceptual stability, neither the core nor the margin
of a concept changes (in our schematic terms, a1a2a3a4 is present in more
than one author at more than one time). In the case of conceptual change, the
margin of a concept changes, whereas the core remains the same (you might
have a1a2a3 at time t1, and a1a2a4 at time t2). Finally, if the core of a concept
changes, we can speak of conceptual replacement (you have a1a2 at time t1,
say, but at t2 there is only a1). In cases of conceptual stability, historical
actors accept identical concepts; in cases of conceptual change, they accept
varieties of concepts; in cases of conceptual replacement, different concepts.
In this way, we can identify continuities throughout history by referring to
the stability of the (same) core in different varieties of a concept, and disconti-
nuities by referring to the varying margins of these varieties.
Against (c) Scope. Kuukkanen’s solution to (b) is also a solution to (c).
Recall that the alleged problem is that we risk deﬁning an idea too broadly
if we deﬁne it in such a way that it encompasses the views of several different
authors, and too narrowly if we try to deﬁne it in such a way that it encom-
passes the view of only one particular author. On Kuukkanen’s account we
can do both at the same time: we can specify a set of features of a concept
(core) that is shared by a variety of thinkers. We can then contextualize
this concept by describing its varying margins in different authors. In this
manner, we can identify concepts adopted by various authors (by referring
to its core) and highlight the peculiarities of an author’s use of a concept
(by referring to its margins).
Against (d) arbitrariness and biases. As we have seen, Skinner rejects Love-
joy’s method because, he thinks, (i) it does not allow us to understand the
meaning and relevance of historical texts, for it abstracts from the study of
authors’ intentions; (ii) it is necessarily biased. One might ﬁnd this criticism
not entirely fair, for Lovejoy himself argues that historians should take an
author’s intentions into account while performing careful empirical and
textual research, and this entails placing texts in their historical context
(Lovejoy, ‘Reﬂections’, 13–14; Wilson, ‘Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of





























Being’, 202; Knight, ‘Unit-Ideas Unleashed’, 213). Yet the question is,
of course, how we should do this concretely. There is no full speciﬁcation of
the method of the history of ideas that shows Skinner’s worry to be unjustiﬁed.
And if this is the objection, then it has not yet been countered adequately.
Let us take stock. There is still work to be done to provide an adequate
defence of Lovejoy’s methodology. Two points, (a) and (d), have not yet
been adequately countered. In particular, Kuukkanen’s successful rebuttal
of objections (b) and (c) cannot be also used to address (a) and (d). For Kuuk-
kanen’s core/margin distinction, however correct, gives us only a vocabulary
of conceptual change. It does not tell us how the general idea should be
implemented. Once we counter (b) and (c) by saying that there is a core to
a concept, and it is that core that shows continuity through time, how do
we identify this core in such a way that, against Skinner, it avoids arbitrary
and biased narratives (d), and in such a way, against the holists, that the
continuity of such cores can be adequately accounted for (a)?
In the following three sections, we develop an implementable method-
ology for the history of ideas that accounts adequately for both holist objec-
tion (a) and Skinner’s objection (d), in part by improving on Kuukkanen’s
core/margin distinction ad (b) and (c).
As to (a), we take a middle position, so to speak, between holists and their
opponents: with the holist, we say that it is trivially correct to say that ideas
are different in different authors, for ideas do change; yet, against the holist,
we say that this observation does not jeopardize the method of the history of
ideas, for in case of continuity, we say, there is something that remains
constant that we can trace. But, against Lovejoy and Kuukkanen, we think
there is no need to construe ‘something remaining constant’ as (strict)
identity among ideas. We maintain in particular that in certain cases, the
something that remains constant across contexts is not (strict) identity
among ideas, but structural isomorphism among (speciﬁc embodiments of
parts of) conceptual models. This means that our proposal enables us to
detect continuities in some cases of conceptual replacement as well (cases
where both the core and margin of a concept change) because sometimes
the continuity does not even regard ideas, but the place, role, or function
that a certain idea occupies in the context of certain conceptual structures.
As to Skinner’s objections ad (d), we counter them by arguing that inter-
pretive models must do historical justice to the manner in which authors con-
strue concepts, and that the use of explicit interpretative models is the best
defence against the risk of interpretative bias.
THE MODEL APPROACH TO HISTORY OF IDEAS
In this and the following two sections, we propose a method for the history of
ideas or concept drift (conceptual change and replacement) based on what
we call models. In our model approach ideas or concepts are construed as





























(parts of) models, that is, complex conceptual frameworks. The ideas we can
do history of, we maintain, are (highly) complex.2
We proceed as follows. In this section, we deal with the ﬁrst of Skinner’s
objections under (d), namely the arbitrariness objection. We argue that
concept cores must be singled out in a way that reﬂects the manner in
which authors construe that concept; we also claim, with the support of
work in computer science, that historians must consider not only how the
authors they study construed a concept’s intension (core and margin), as
Kuukkanen indicates, but also how they construed its extension. In the
ﬁfth section, we explain how the method of history of ideas can best be
implemented by using explicit and clearly designed interpretive models. In
the ﬁfth section, we also consider the holist’s critique (a). For the time
being, we disregard (a), and take for granted the legitimacy of the claim
that concepts or ideas retain their identities through time. In the sixth
section, we deal with the second of Skinner’s objections under (d), namely
the biases objection.
Versus Skinner’s Arbitrariness Objection (d): Historians Must Commit
to the View that Concept Cores are relevant for the Authors They Study
Skinner’s arbitrariness objection at (d) can be countered as follows. In iden-
tifying the core of a concept, we may include only features that, next to being
ascribed to the concept by historical actors themselves, are also relevant fea-
tures of the concept for the authors in question. Historians must commit to
afﬁrm that what they identify as the core of the concept is also signiﬁcant
for the authors they study. This, we submit, prevents us from foisting arbi-
trary narratives upon the authors we study – at least in principle, from the
methodological point of view. The point is that we must be able to be
proven wrong: the historian must commit to an objective reconstruction.
In singling out the core of a concept, we generate empirical hypotheses,
albeit hypotheses necessarily constrained by the historian’s interest. In our
approach, historians of ideas attempt thus to provide realistic (objectively
constrained) insightful interpretations. Importantly, our position does not
require that the historical actors literally and explicitly say they hold a
certain concept x with such and such signiﬁcant features. Historical actors
may hold such concept cores only implicitly. In the latter case, it is for the
historian to make concept cores explicit and provide non-literal evidence
that their authors themselves actually did hold those concept cores in the
same way. This can be done, for instance, by inferential means, that is, by
2An anonymous reviewer has pointed us to Gracia’s valuable ‘framework approach’ for the
history of philosophy (Philosophy and Its History, 279–88). A comparison between
Gracia’s and our approach would deserve a separate paper; here we just note that Gracia’s fra-
meworks, which include formulations of philosophical problems and criteria for evaluating
philosophical arguments, are more general than our models, which are highly speciﬁc concep-
tual frameworks designed explicitly to study concept drift.





























employing cogent arguments. We return to the notion of relevance in the fol-
lowing section and consider the explicitness constraint again in the sixth
section.
The position we have just outlined seems to be in part shared by Kuukka-
nen himself. However, Kuukkanen argues that the main criterion for identi-
fying concept cores as such selected features is the research interest of the
historian (Kuukkanen, ‘Conceptual Change’, 367–9, 371), and the idea of
historians choosing a concept core according to their interest leads Kuukka-
nen to describe his own position as a form of conventionalism. Were we to
take seriously Kuukkanen’s talk of conventionalism, we would not be able to
counter Skinner’s arbitrariness objection because a conventionalist position
on selecting concept cores would not prevent us from foisting arbitrary nar-
ratives upon our actors. For if, in identifying the core of a concept, the main
criterion is our research interest, we may end up disregarding the features of
a concept that historical actors themselves deemed most important – and be
methodologically legitimated in doing so.
Extensional Shifts Must Also be Part of Studying Concept Drift
In line with a standard technical position in philosophy, Kuukkanen identiﬁes
the meaning of a concept with its intension, which in turn he identiﬁes with
its core and margin. However, related research in computer science and infor-
mation technology, where the topic of concept drift is hotly debated, suggests
that the extension of concepts is also relevant to historians’ practice. In a
recent paper, Wang, Schlobach, and Klein (‘Concept Drift’) provide an
account of conceptual change which is almost identical to the one proposed
by Kuukkanen, yet differs from Kuukkanen’s in approaching concept drift in
terms of intension and extension. The reason is that changes in the extension
of a concept are often indications of changes in its intension; the former, that
is, are often helpful in detecting the latter. Consider the concept of an EU
country, that is, a country belonging to the European Union. The extension of
this concept differs through time. When confronted with certain changes in
extension in the data, one likely conjecture is that the meaning of the concept
of an EU country has changed. Wang, Schlobach, and Klein is of great value
for the working historian because historians often reason to shifts in the mean-
ings of concepts by detecting shifts in their extensions. Think of your texts as
data: the data will often show only shifts in concept extensions. By regarding
this as (often) evidential of a shift in concept intensions, you can formulate
an initial hypothesis of concept drift. And if we directly hypothesize intensional
shifts, we can then check our hypotheses by identifying extension shifts.
Consider the following example. Historians have noted that Kant did not
apply the concept of life to plants, though he did apply it to animals and
humans. Yet for Kant, humans, animals, and plants are all organisms; therefore,
the concepts of life and organism in Kant are not co-extensive (Zammito, ‘Tele-
ology Then and Now’, 762–3). The reason for this lies in their different





























intensions: according to Kant, life is the capacity to move oneself, while organ-
isms are objects in which every part is both an end and a means. Unlike Kant,
many other philosophers and scientists at the end of the eighteenth century did
apply the concept of life to plants, though their construal of organism was
similar to Kant’s. Alexander von Humboldt, for example, described life as a
physico-electrical force that maintains bodies in their original form (Richards,
Romantic Conception, 316–21). This phenomenon indicates a complex shift
in the intension of the concept of life, which can be recognized by studying
the change in its extension. If we wish to describe the history of the concept
of life from Kant onwards, we can thus ﬁrst reconstruct the intension and exten-
sion of Kant’s concept of life, and subsequently employ this account to study
theorists after Kant, highlighting continuities and discontinuities in the
meaning (intension) and application (extension) of this concept.
We conclude that if historians wish to study concept drift, they need to
specify how the authors they study construe both the intension of the
concept in question (its core and margin, or meaning) and its extension
(reference). A reliable method in the history of ideas should incorporate
this consideration explicitly.
Let us sum up. The method we propose requires that historians of ideas (1)
distinguish between the core and margin of a concept, identifying the core by
selecting signiﬁcant features of the concept in question; (2) specify the
extension of concepts, and thus study concept drift by examining shifts in
both intension and extension. The question that now arises is this: how
can we effectively accomplish (1)–(2)?
One important thing to realize is that in order to do this we must ﬁnd a way
to represent many (shifting) relations among the features (subconcepts) of
complex concepts, which will often form a network. In our view, this is
best accomplished by using models. We take models here to be explicitly
stated conceptual frameworks developed intentionally to achieve insightful
interpretive goals. Models are abstract relational structures or networks of
(sub)concepts including, crucially, determinables.
In the next section, we illustrate our proposal in detail by presenting a
model of the complex concept of proper science, used by scholars within
the history of philosophy and science. We will show in what sense the
history of ideas can be properly conducted by using models such as these,
that is, conducted in such a way as to answer the holists’ and Skinner’s
objections at (a) and (d).
MODELS, BY EXAMPLE
The Classical Model of Science
We will illustrate our model approach to the history of ideas by discussing a
model recently applied in the history of philosophy and of science: de Jong





























and Betti’s Classical Model of Science (CMS). This model has been devel-
oped by improving on previous systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of
science (Scholz, ‘Die Axiomatik’; Beth, Foundations, 31–2), and set up
with the aim of specifying in an interpretive framework a historically inﬂu-
ential ideal of axiomatic science. This ideal is reconstructed on the basis of
Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora, The Logic of Port Royal, and Bolzano’s
Wissenschaftslehre among other important philosophical works (de Jong
and Betti, ‘Classical Model’).
The CMS is articulated in seven conditions that capture the concept of
proper science according to a certain ideal. These conditions, for any
system S of propositions and concepts (terms), are as follows:
(1) All propositions and all concepts (or terms) of S concern a speciﬁc set
of objects or are about a certain domain of being(s).
(2a) There are in S a number of so-called fundamental concepts (or terms).
(2b) All other concepts (or terms) occurring in S are composed of (or are
deﬁnable from) these fundamental concepts (or terms).
(3a) There are in S a number of so-called fundamental propositions.
(3b) All other propositions of S follow from or are grounded in (or
are provable or demonstrable from) these fundamental propositions.
(4) All propositions of S are true.
(5) All propositions of S are universal and necessary in some sense or
another.
(6) All propositions of S are known to be true. A non-fundamental prop-
osition is known to be true through its proof in S.
(7) All concepts or terms of S are adequately known. A non-fundamental
concept is adequately known through its composition (or deﬁnition).
(de Jong and Betti, ‘Classical Model’, 186).
These conditions are highly abstract. Together they are meant to capture the
basics of an axiomatic view of science that was held by multiple thinkers in
various periods. In the core/margin terminology laid out in the previous sec-
tions, conditions (1)–(7) ﬁx the core of the concept of proper science accord-
ing to the axiomatic ideal. As is clear, the concept of proper science
articulated here is also highly complex: its core is described as a relational
structure of seven conditions containing, in turn, many (sub)concepts.3
If (1–7) are the core, what are the margins of the concept of proper
science? To see this, keep in mind that, as noted, conditions (1–7) are
highly abstract. First and foremost, the sense in which (1–7) are abstract is
3Mind that de Jong and Betti do not claim that theirs is a normative model of what science
should be. They merely claim descriptively that the above conditions offer an articulation
of what some philosophers and scientists throughout history have themselves regarded as
the ideal characteristics of a proper science (the CMS is a ‘description of a norm’, cf. Betti,
‘On Haslanger’s’).





























that they are general, due to the fact that the (sub) concepts they contain are
determinables. This is for instance the case of the subconcept proposition in
conditions (1), (3), and (4–6). We will have more to say about this
determinable later on. In a second sense, conditions (1–7) are abstract for
having been abstracted or being made general (to be precise, set up via a
combination of abstraction and abduction) taking a cue from, among
others, inﬂuential views on science found in Aristotle, The Logic of Port
Royal, and Bolzano. Now, as de Jong and Betti point out, these general con-
ditions (1–7) can be speciﬁed in different manners, that is, the determinables
contained in conditions (1–7) might be determined – embodied, instantiated,
encoded – by different authors in different ways (‘Classical Model’,
189–93). These speciﬁc determinations give us the margin of the concept
of proper science.
In terms of the core/margin terminology, de Jong and Betti’s claim is that
whereas many thinkers adhered to the core of the concept of proper science
as ﬁxed by (1–7), this concept may differ in different thinkers in its margins,
that is, authors may apply or interpret those conditions differently. By spe-
cifying the margins of the concept of proper science, we thus indicate its
variable features. And thus, in applying the Model to individual thinkers
by specifying conditions (1–7), we are able to contextualize the model. In
this way, we can maintain that various authors, say Bolzano and Kant,
have adhered to the same conception of proper science and still allow for
variation. For if we were to specify Kant’s ideal conception of proper
science, it would be wrong to say that he thinks it requires fundamental prop-
ositions, but right to say that he thinks it requires some other fundamental
items, namely judgements. In other words, the (sub)concept of some item
x that is fundamental (3a), from which other items x1… xn follow and
which is such that it can be said to be true, belongs to the core of this
concept of proper science, that is, axiomatic science. Item x can be indicated
more generally, using the terminology of analytic metaphysics and philos-
ophy of language, as a truthbearer: being a truthbearer is a role that can
be played by different items, among which one may count Kant’s judge-
ments, Bolzano’s propositions in themselves, or Frege’s thoughts. There is
no axiomatic science without axioms (core), but there is still axiomatic
science when the axioms are determined as propositions rather than judge-
ments or thoughts (margins). To make this clearer, let us consider the
model in its most stripped down version, one that reveals only its core:
(1) S has items xs and items ys that are about a.
(2a) Some ys in S are fundamental (call them Fys).
(2b) All non-fundamental ys in S are composed or deﬁnable from Fys.
(3a) Some xs in S are fundamental (call them Fxs).
(3b) All non-fundamental xs in S follow from [are grounded in or are pro-
vable or demonstrable from] Fxs.
(4) All xs in S are true.





























(5) All xs in S are universal and necessary in some sense.
(6) All xs in S are known to be true. Non-fundamental xs are known to be
true through their proof or demonstration or grounding proof in S.
(7) All ys in S are adequately known. Non-fundamental ys are ade-
quately known through their composition or deﬁnition.
In bold you see features of the core, which is stable, while the variables x, y
are place-holders for determinables. Note that the determinables x, y do not
admit just anything as substitutes: for instance, x can only stand for
(expressions referring to) something that can be true (4), is known to be
true (6), etc., while y can only stand for something that can be deﬁned,
etc. Consider now condition (3b). Condition (3b) captures the axiomatic
ordering of propositions, judgements or any other truthbearing item in a
science. It requires that non-fundamental items follow from fundamental
ones (core), but this concept of following from can have a strong construal
(margin) as explanative demonstration or grounding, which makes – by
determination – following from a notion corresponding to the traditional
Aristotelian notion of a scientiﬁc syllogism or demonstratio propter quid
(de Jong and Betti, ‘Classical Model’, 190). One clear example of this
strong interpretation in modern times is Bolzano, though this strong con-
strual has been abandoned by later authors. Note that the latter claim, that
is, that Bolzano had a strong interpretation of (3b) and that this construal
was later abandoned, is, in keeping with what we said in the fourth
section, a (complex) empirical research hypothesis. The CMS allows us to
test this hypothesis in the following way. By using this model in their
interpretations, historians can make explicit, ﬁrst, that 3b belongs to the
core of the notion of proper science they are considering. They might then
hypothesize that speciﬁc actors, for example, Bolzano and some later
authors, thought of proper science as an axiomatic ideal (continuity, core).
Second, since 3b is general, it allows for both stronger and weaker con-
struals. Our historians can, therefore, put forth the hypothesis that, within
the same conception of axiomatic science, Bolzano and later authors have
different construals of the same notion of following from (which is a discon-
tinuity, and regards the margins). This same procedure is adopted for all
conditions.
Recall now our reply to Skinner’s arbitrariness objection ad (d ), that is,
that in identifying the core of a concept, we may include only features
that, in addition to being acknowledged as belonging to the concept by the
historical actors themselves, are also relevant for them. By applying the
Model to reconstruct historical actors’ views of science, we indeed
commit ourselves to the following four claims (two about the concept’s
core, one about its margins, and one about neither).
First (core), we claim that the concept of science according to (1)–(7) is
accepted by these historical actors; that is, it is construed by them in the
manner indicated by the bold (stable) part of these conditions.





























Second (core), we claim that no other condition plays a more or equally
signiﬁcant role in shaping the notion of proper science; that is, that there
is no eighth feature of the concept of proper science, missing from our
list, that is at least equally relevant to the thought or philosophical system
of our authors. The conditions listed, then, are both necessary and sufﬁcient.
This is a matter of empirical research: hence (1)–(7) allows us to formulate
empirical hypotheses concerning what philosophers and scientists them-
selves took science to be.
Third (margins), we claim that when we describe the way in which deter-
minables get determined in the thought of certain authors, we describe the
author’s intentions; what they really meant.4
While the ﬁrst claim accords easily with Kuukkanen’s account, the last
two claims are novel. We maintain that the addition of these last two
claims serves to address the ﬁrst of Skinner’s criticisms at (d), namely arbi-
trariness. For although the systematization of this particular complex concept
(proper science) via the CMS, in particular via the core captured by the deter-
minables at (1–7), does represent a particular historian’s choice, this choice
is not arbitrary. De Jong and Betti developed the Model because they
regarded this particular view of ideal axiomatic science as interesting and
highly useful in framing insightful historical accounts of deep and long-
standing issues in the history of philosophy (not only in the history of
science or in the philosophy of science). This concept of science, they
submit, has been dominant for two millennia, and been adopted by a wide
variety of thinkers such as Spinoza, Wolff, Kant, and later Bolzano,
Husserl, and Frege. But it is an historical claim, and an explicit and revisable
hypothesis that authors did adhere to (a certain determination of) the CMS.
Fourth, by using the CMS to do the history of ideas, we claim that certain
(sub)ideas occupy a certain place in the conceptual relations established by
this model. The important advantage of this over Kuukkanen’s original core/
margin approach is that the latter cannot account for conceptual continuities
through history unless they regard either the core or the margins of a concept.
Our model approach enables us to do more, insofar as the use of models
allows us to trace the continuity of ideas not only with regard to their core/
margin but also with regard to the structural place that a certain concept
occupies in a model. The model approach thereby affords a more realistic
and general methodology than is available from any other existing account.
Like the second and the third, this fourth point is also novel and important
to counter holistic objections at (a). We will substantiate it by considering a
4It is sometimes argued that historians cannot know the intentions of authors. Although a dis-
cussion of this issue would exceed the scope of this paper, we wish to stress two points. First, if
the intentions of an author cannot be known, Skinner’s claim that Lovejoy’s methodology
results in arbitrary narratives is unjustiﬁed. Second, even if we cannot know the intentions
of an author, this would not invalidate our approach. For we can then still use models to
make explicit our interpretations and to reconstruct how concepts are used in historical
texts, as our discussion of the CMS elucidates.





























particular application of models in the history of ideas: de Jong’s use of the
CMS to study analyticity in Kant and Bolzano (de Jong, ‘Bernard Bolzano’;
de Jong, ‘Analytic-Synthetic Distinction’).
Kant was the ﬁrst to apply the analytic–synthetic distinction to statements
(which Kant called ‘judgements’). Before Kant, this distinction had been
applied only to methods. In his Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano credits Kant
for recognizing the applicability of this distinction to statements, which
Bolzano called ‘propositions’ (Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, 83). Given
this, one would perhaps expect to ﬁnd some continuity between Kant’s
and Bolzano’s views on this topic. Yet this is hardly the case. Kant and
Bolzano in fact construe the concept of analyticity in quite different ways.
Recognizing this, the historian of ideas will want to know why this is so:
why did Bolzano’s modify Kant’s account of analyticity?
To explain Bolzano’s motives, de Jong employs the CMS (‘Bernard
Bolzano’, 329–33, 340–9). Both Kant and Bolzano, de Jong argues, (I)
accept (1)–(7) in some determination, and both, crucially, hold that (II) ana-
lytic statements play only a marginal role in a science. Bolzano, de Jong con-
tinues, has a strong take on (3b): scientiﬁc proofs should be explanatory; that
is, the relation of following from between fundamental (axioms) and non-
fundamental (theorems) statements of a science is such that theorems are
grounded in axioms on the basis of explanatory proofs. He thinks that
sciences are ordered by explanatory proofs in such a way that some state-
ments (grounds) are more general than other statements (consequences),
and takes this idea to suggest that in a science some analytic propositions
should be grounded by and derived frommore general synthetic propositions
pertaining to that science (ibid., 345–9). This ﬁts nicely with (II) above, that
is, the view that analytic statements play only a marginal role in any science,
because in this way, they turn out to be somewhat trivial consequences of
synthetic propositions. For example, Bolzano regards the more general syn-
thetic statement (A), ‘the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles’, as a ground for the more particular analytic statement (B), ‘the
angles of this particular triangle are together equal to two right angles’. It
is here that the differences between Kant’s and Bolzano’s views on analyti-
city become clear. For whereas Bolzano takes (A) to be synthetic and (B) to
be analytic, Kant takes both (A) and (B) to be synthetic. In addition, Kant
thought that mathematical statements had to be proven by means of what
he called a constructive procedure in pure intuition. This procedure was
not recognized by Bolzano as a scientiﬁc demonstration because in such a
procedure we prove more general mathematical statements (A) on the
basis of more particular statements (B). According to Bolzano, then, Kant
did not understand the order of proof proper to mathematics (i.e. that one
should move from the more general to the more particular) (ibid.).
In short, by applying the CMS, de Jong manages to reconstruct the
relations among the concepts of analyticity, grounding or scientiﬁc expla-
nation, and generality. Now note, in connection with the fourth point





























above, that while grounding (as a strong take on condition (3b)) belongs to
the core of the concept of science as presented by the CMS, analyticity does
not: it is a (sub)concept belonging neither to the core of the concept nor to its
margins. But Bolzano’s views on analyticity, conceived as a critique of
Kant’s view of the order of proof within mathematics, are understandable
only in light of a reconstruction of the manifold of relations between the
(sub)concept of analyticity and the concepts belonging to the core of the
notion of proper science as systematized by (1–7) as well as other concepts.
By applying the CMS, de Jong brings Bolzano’s views more clearly into
focus. This shows that the model approach allows us to study concept
drift in a manner at once more realistic (ﬁrst three points above) and
general (fourth point) than afforded by other existing approaches.
We have now seen in what sense the method of the history of ideas can be
implemented by using models. Two points remain to be considered: the
holists’ objection, and Skinner’s biases objection.
Against (a): Unit-Ideas Need Not Be One in Number and Holism Need
Not Be False
Our method, though fundamentally in line with Lovejoy’s, differs from his
on two important points. First, we do not think that we must hold that
holism is false to do the history of ideas legitimately because we do not
think that we must assume that the ideas we are working with retain their
identity through time. Second, we think there is no reason to regard the
ideas we are working with as simple. Quite the contrary, we think that
these ideas will often be highly complex.
Let us examine the ﬁrst of these points. What would a holist say to the claim
that (1)–(7) capture a shared core of the concept of proper science, enabling us
to detect continuities? A holist can simply point to the fact that Kant, Frege, and
Bolzano all interpreted the axioms of a science to be different objects, namely
judgements, propositions, and thoughts, and so conclude that they held different
concepts of axioms, and thus too of science. This observation is correct: strictly
speaking the holist is right. Yet we do not think the historian of ideas should be
troubled by this. That is, contrary to Lovejoy and Kuukkanen, we think that his-
torians of ideas need not prove the holist wrong to continue doing their job.
What they need is a workable way to trace discontinuity within continuity,
and, we maintain, this is possible by using models such as the CMS, for it is
the abstract relational nature of conditions (1)–(7) that allows historians to
do so.
Let us look at this a bit more closely. The question of what concepts are
and how they retain their identity over time is fundamentally a philosophical
one. Its answer will depend on philosophical theories of meaning and iden-
tity, and there is no conclusive reason to take the belief that concepts retain
their identity over time to be true. Recall that Lovejoy and Kuukkanen both
respond to holistic criticisms by arguing that holism is false, because it





























absurdly implies that ideas are incommunicable. But no holist would accept
this argument. To do justice to the communicability of ideas one needs only
to establish their similarity of meaning (content similarity), and meaning
similarity seems fully consistent with holism. Such similarity-based theories
of concepts are on offer (see e.g. Decock and Douven, ‘Similarity’). So, his-
torians of ideas who wish to base their methodology on the claim that holism
is false are committed to a philosophical position on which no consensus has
emerged. This is problematic. Of course, since no consensus has emerged
either concerning the nature of holism, it is equally problematic to take
holism as a basis for rejecting the history of ideas as a legitimate project.
The question of whether concepts retain their identity over time is simply
an unsolved philosophical question. Where does this leave us?
We propose that to do the history of ideas, we only need to assume that
something serves as a constant, under which (or within which, if you
prefer) discontinuities can be traced. ‘Something remaining constant’ is con-
strued by Lovejoy and Kuukkanen as (strict) identity among ideas (that is,
we have one concept and not two), but this seems too strong. History of
ideas can be based on weaker notions, such as similarity, subsumption of
some concepts under more general concepts, family resemblance, or struc-
tural isomorphism. Questions such as these do not need to be settled in
order to get to work. We have explained our proposal in terms of a
general abstract relational framework (1–7); a model, that is, which allows
us to determine determinables seen as variables. This notion of ‘determi-
nation’ can be deﬁned in various ways, and we see no point in insisting
that it must mean, for example, that there is numerically one concept of truth-
bearer represented in the CMS, determined by numerically three different
concepts in Kant, Bolzano, and Frege, namely judgement, proposition, and
thought. Talk of ‘determinables’ here has no ontological signiﬁcance: if
one prefers an additive account like Kuukkanen’s (one which, for
example, identiﬁes concepts by addition, adding core + margin 1, or
core + margin 2 + margin 3, etc.), our models can be freely reformulated
in that style (e.g. by formulating the conditions disjunctively, such as: (1)
S has judgements or propositions or thoughts or…which are about a). In
fact, we do not even see a point in insisting that speciﬁcally concepts (in
the technical philosophical meaning) compose the core of the notion of
science according to (1–7), namely follow from, truth, etc. Not only, then,
do we see no need to prove the holist wrong, we also think that using
models allows us to incorporate nicely some of the holistic objections into
our own method while maintaining, against the holist, that something can
remain common through time. As we saw, this something can also be a struc-
ture, or the place of certain ideas in a model. This is where our second point
of difference with Lovejoy becomes clear.
There is no reason to regard the concepts we investigate using models as
simple. On the contrary, we hold that the ‘ideas’ in ‘the history of ideas’ are
bound to be concepts that are highly complex, as well as abstract, if we want





























to practise the history of ideas in the most fruitful way. Recall again the
concept of proper science as articulated in the CMS. Our method implies
that the history of ideas is a discipline concerned with describing concept
drift by describing relations among (sub)concepts that form the intension
of other, highly complex concepts; as complex as the concept of proper
science in our example. And here is where the holists’ point may in fact
be illuminating.
When a concept x is, say, in the concept constellation xyz, the holist would
maintain, x is really no longer x, but rather x-in-xyz; when x is in xwr, it is in
fact not x (not ‘the same’ x), but rather x-in-xwr. Therefore, in these cases x
can at most be similar (there are two xs), not the same (it is not one x). This is
not only perfectly accountable in terms of our method, but also simply
correct and in tune with how our method really works. For the CMS is a
complex abstract constellation that is, strictly speaking, not really as such
endorsed by anybody: only its speciﬁcations are endorsed. When we work
with the Model, we reconstruct speciﬁcations that are at most similar to
each other, similar with respect to, indeed, (their function as ﬁxed by) the
Model. Such is the case with Bolzano’s axioms as propositions versus
Kant’s axioms as judgements. This situation applies also to doing the
history of concepts that do not share any features in Kukkanen’s sense,
but which occupy a similar place in the network of concepts speciﬁed in a
certain model. Suppose that, for example, x stands for analyticity, that is,
a (sub)concept that, as we have seen, belongs neither to the core of the
concept of proper science nor to its margins (it does not appear in 1–7),
and bearing this in mind consider again de Jong’s study of Bolzano and
Kant. When we study x using (1–7), we reconstruct x as embedded in the
complex network of subconcepts in (1–7) which itself contains determin-
ables: the concept of analyticity in Kant and Bolzano differs, but its place
in the complex relational network of concepts, as ﬁxed by the Model, is
similar: analytic statements occupy a functionally similar place in the
same conception of proper science held by both Kant and Bolzano. And
this conception is the same in the sense that its speciﬁcations have the
same or a similar structure; it is with respect to this structure that they are
similar. This means that our approach allows us to detect continuities even
in some cases of conceptual replacement (that is, also when both core and
margin change).
SKINNER’S BIASES OBJECTION (D): MODELS AS COGNITIVE
SCHEMATA
We may now address the last remaining objection: Skinner’s biases objec-
tion. Using models, Skinner argues, is not conducive to proper historical
writing, for models are a representation of our own mindset, which, being





























our own and not that of the authors we study, is necessarily biased. Models
may make us see things in historical texts that are not really there.
We do not think Skinner can be proven wrong. But his objection can be
turned on its head: exactly because the risk of biased reconstructions is
real, biases must be made as explicit and precise as possible by turning
them into models. If historians employ models such as the CMS in interpret-
ing texts, their presuppositions are there for all to see. Moreover, by using
models, the object of investigation is more clearly deﬁned and delimited,
for example, proper science as articulated in the CMS. Hypotheses devel-
oped on the basis of models are, besides, readily open to falsiﬁcation.5
We thus submit that, far from being a danger, the use of models in fact pro-
vides a better methodology in the history of ideas than one that does not use
them. To further substantiate this claim, we will argue that models, next to
providing a defence against interpretative biases, also increase the under-
standing of historical texts. Our claims in this section are of broader interest,
since they support the use of models in history in general, not only in the
history of ideas. We support our case by reference to work in cognitive
psychology.
Can models such as the CMS be considered, as Skinner suggests, a rep-
resentation of our mindset? Yes. We argue that the CMS is (a representation
of) a cognitive schema in the sense of the so-called schema theory of knowl-
edge, yet that precisely this circumstance, far from damaging our position, in
fact supports it.
In what sense are models like the CMS cognitive schemas? Stressed by
cognitive scientists and educational psychologists from the 1970s
onwards, schemata are mental frameworks for organizing information
(Anderson, ‘Notion of Schemata’; Rumelhart, ‘Schemata’; Rumelhart and
Ortony, ‘Representation of Knowledge’). They can be represented by
networks of (sub)concepts. When schemata are activated, as is said in the
literature, they increase a reader’s capacity to comprehend passages in
texts. In fact, it is argued, without schemata understanding is impossible.
As Anderson remarks in a discussion of reading comprehension, ‘text is
gobbledygook unless the reader possesses an interpretative framework to
breathe meaning into it’ (Anderson, ‘Notion of Schemata’, 423).
Importantly for the comparison with our models, schemata are character-
ized as being abstract. By virtue of being abstract, they can be applied to a
variety of cases; or, we can say, they contain determinables or variables that
can be associated with various (sub)concepts (Rumelhart, ‘Schemata’, 35).
In addition, schemata are structured, insofar as they represent relationships
among sub(conceptual) parts. They also provide context and vocabulary for
what we read, and are taken to organize experience. Schemata are also
dynamic – and in fact, in order to accommodate new experiences, they
5These virtues of models have been stressed by socio-economic historians (Lorenz,
De Constructie, 243–81).





























must be so. When new information is comprehended in terms of an already
existing schema, schema theorists speak of assimilation or accretion; if new
information is used to create a new schema, schema theorists speak of
restructuring; if, ﬁnally, new information is used to modify an existing
schema so as to make it more accurate or useful, schema theorists speak
of tuning schemas (Rumelhart and Norman, ‘Accretion’).
Consider now again the CMS as described in the previous section. It is
easy to see that the salient characteristics of schemata apply to it. The
CMS analyses the concept of proper science as a conjunction of seven
abstract conditions containing determinable (variables) subconcepts. It rep-
resents a network of relations among these subconcepts, and provides a
vocabulary and context for interpretation. By applying the CMS to the writ-
ings of various thinkers, historians determine or contextualize this model, on
which basis they interpret and comprehend the views of various
philosophers on science. Is the CMS dynamic? Yes: Betti and de Jong
have restructured earlier versions of a similar model by Beth and Scholz,
partially in light of new evidence. Indeed, insofar as the Model enables
the formation of empirical hypotheses, it should always be open to restruc-
turing and tuning.
These similarities between the CMS and schemata are evidence that it is a
schema. We may therefore expect that it furthers the comprehension of
certain philosophical texts. It is not customary in philosophy to test hypoth-
eses of this kind experimentally. We ourselves did, however, conduct a small
qualitative experiment in a class on the work of Edmund Husserl. The fol-
lowing passage from Husserl (Logische Untersuchungen, §64) was pre-
sented to a small group of students with an elementary knowledge of
Husserl’s thought:
For many readers lacking prior knowledge, as for the students in our present
case, this text is, again, gobbledygook. Yet if we apply the various con-
ditions of the Model as indicated, that is, if we activate a schema, the
reader can begin to organize, interpret and make sense of the passage in
question. This is a process of both contextualizing a schema and placing a
text in context.






























We have presented a new and implementable methodology for the history of
ideas. Lovejoy’s history of ideas has been rejected in the past on the ground
that (i) the existence of unit-ideas is not compatible with holism. It has also
been argued that it is neither clear (ii) how the meaning of unit-ideas can
change, nor (iii) how one should deﬁne the scope of unit-ideas, and (iv)
that the history of ideas often yields arbitrary and biased narratives. These
criticisms are taken to show that the history of ideas involves an improper
historical method.
We have shown that Kuukkanen’s defence of Lovejoy’s approach, by dis-
tinguishing between the core and the margin of ideas or concepts, is able to
counter two of these objections ((ii) and (iii)), yet remains vulnerable to (i)
and (iv). Given this lingering vulnerability, Kuukkanen’s defence does not
manage to show that the history of ideas is a proper historical method, nor
does it provide an implementable methodology for the history of ideas.
By contrast, our model approach does provide an implementable method-
ology for the history of ideas that counters all four of the objections men-
tioned above and allows us to show in what sense the history of ideas is a
legitimate method. While we adopt Kuukkanen’s vocabulary of concept
core/margin to describe concept drift in the history of ideas, we argue that
concepts must be seen as (parts of) models, that is (complex, interpretive)
conceptual frameworks. Through models such as the CMS, we can make
explicit the stable core and variable margin of highly complex concepts
such as the concept of science. We have shown that our approach can
counter (iv) because of two characteristics of models. First, models can be
set up in such a way as to do justice to the manner in which authors construe
concepts. Granting this, our approach is not susceptible to Skinner’s criti-
cism that the history of ideas yields arbitrary narratives. Second, models
are explicit interpretative frameworks that represent a mindset or schema
in the sense of the schema theory of knowledge in cognitive psychology.
Making an interpretive framework explicit in fact provides the best
defence against the risks of interpretative biases in the writing of intellectual
history, and furthers the comprehension of texts. Furthermore, we have
shown that the model approach can counter the holistic objection ad (i) by
remaining neutral concerning the ontological nature of ideas and by
arguing that our approach allows us to trace continuities in history even
without assuming a notion of (strict) identity between ideas.
The use of models is virtually nonexistent in the history of ideas. We
submit, however, that historians of ideas should use models as schematic
representations to study the development of ideas because models enable
us to represent concept drift as change in a network of (shifting) relations
among subideas, that is, elements of a given complex idea or concept.
Since our models are highly abstract, and can thus be properly applied to
different periods and the work of different thinkers, they provide efﬁcient





























tools for organizing and classifying information and enable ﬁne-grained
analyses of conceptual (dis)continuities, that is, conceptual shifts throughout
history.
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